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ABSTRACT: Worldwide, gang proliferation is fought mostly with tough punishment 
strategies such as sweeps. In this paper, I study their causal effect on crime for arrested 
individuals and known peers following a difference-in-differences strategy. I also take 
advantage of the network structure I retrieved to assess peer effects and identify key 
players. I perform such an analysis with novel administrative data from the Metropolitan 
Area of Barcelona, where Latin gangs expanded rapidly and where a stark policy change 
occurred. Results show significant reductions in crimes of arrested individuals and their 
peers, particularly in crimes against the person. The areas of the sweeps benefit from 
improvements in crime, health and education. I further conduct an innovative 
counterfactual policy exercise comparing sweep outcomes with theoretically predicted 
crime reductions when removing key players. This exercise indicates that sweeps could 
have achieved a 50% larger reduction in criminal activity had key players been removed. In 
this way, a network analysis provides insights on how to improve policy design. 
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1 Introduction
Since the 1980s, efforts to detect criminal organizations involved in drug trafficking have
intensified, and sanctions have toughened (Mansour et al. 2006, Sweeten et al. 2013, Less-
ing 2016). At the same time, research has shown that individual choices regarding crime
participation are affected by existing norms and networks (Glaeser and Sacerdote 1999), by
providing role models, learning opportunities, and information diffusion. Crime-targeting
policies should take such influences into account. The role of norms and networks in crime
is particularly relevant when dealing with gangs. These are defined as “any durable, street-
oriented youth group, whose involvement in illegal activities is part of their group identity”1.
These criminal groups raise concerns for several reasons, such as the recruitment of partic-
ularly vulnerable young individuals, the high degree of involvement demanded from their
members, and the low prospects of reinsertion into society. On the matter of crime-fighting
policies, two broad sets of strategies exist. One strand relies on hard punishment and sturdy
prosecution, while the other one rests on dialogue and integration. Concerning gangs, the
former has been more popular, and interventions such as sweeps or crackdowns have been
the most common action. However, little is known about how they work. For a better
understanding, it is crucial to understand the network structure of the gangs.
This paper studies the effects of police sweeps against gangs. Specifically, this paper
answers the following research questions: Are sweeps successful at reducing crimes committed
by targeted individuals? Do they also diminish the crimes committed by peers? Can a
network analysis provide insights into how to improve gang sweep design? To answer these
questions, I study the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona (MAB), where a drastic policy change
towards gangs took place. This transformation has involved the creation of police unit
specialized in gang sweeps, and tougher judiciary prosecution. To carry out this analysis,
I use administrative police records for the 2008–2014 period. Such information allows me
to follow individuals over time and identify criminal network structures. I supplement this
with information on the sweeps. To analyze the effects of the sweeps, I follow a staggered
difference-in-differences strategy, by comparing criminal records for arrested individuals and
known peers with those of other group offenders. I also study outcomes in the area of the
sweep, in terms of crime and other relevant socioeconomic variables. In addition, I use the
retrieved network structure to estimate peer effects and identify key players in each gang.
Finally, I conduct a counterfactual policy exercise that compares crime changes caused by the
sweeps with a prediction based on removing key players. Results evidence significant crime
reductions for arrested individuals and known peers. For the first group, the drop in crime is
1Eurogang Network, www.umsl.edu/∼cj/eurogang/euroganghome.htm
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almost 100% and persistent. For the second one, the reduction is 25% and only takes place
in the short term. The biggest fall occurs in crimes against the person. Additionally, the
areas of the sweeps experience improvements in crime, health, and education. Nonetheless,
if sweeps arrested a broader set of key players, they could have achieved a crime reduction
50% larger.
The Metropolitan Area of Barcelona (MAB) provides an appealing setting to study tough-
on-crime policies against gangs for several reasons. It is a context in which Latin gangs
rapidly unfolded following the start of the new millennium. Starting from the almost com-
plete absence of Latin gangs in 2002, 2,500 individuals were identified in 2012 by authorities
as belonging to a Latin gang (Blanco 2012). While the level of this phenomenon does not
compare to that of other settings, the rapid increase is a worrisome characteristic. Addition-
ally, security has become the primary non-economic concern of citizens (Barometer of the
City of Barcelona). In this setting, a drastic policy change has occurred. Until 2012, the
public sector based its strategy on integration into the neighborhood and discouragement
from illegal activities. However, this was not successful with gang members, whose criminal
activities continued to increase. In 2012 the transformation in the public strategy involved
the creation of a centralized and specialized police unit focused solely on criminal investi-
gation and sweeps against gangs. Additionally, the judiciary system implemented sturdier
prosecution of criminal groups. This policy change was not concurrent with any other crime
policy, providing an exogenous shock to gang arrests and a clean identification strategy.
In this analysis, I use administrative and confidential police records provided by the
Local Police (Mossos d’Esquadra) for the 2008–2014 period. This dataset has very detailed
information on the crimes recorded in the MAB as well as on the offenders arrested, when
available. The former includes information on the exact date and exact place of the crime.
The latter includes information on the gender, date, and place of birth of the individual. I
exploit the level of detail of the data in two ways. Firstly, a unique identification number
allows me to follow individuals over time and map out their criminal careers. Secondly, by
matching information on the exact date, hour, place and type of crime, I retrieve criminal
network structures. Finally, I match these records with confidential information on the
sweeps. This last information allows me to label individuals involved in sweeps and their
peers.
To identify the causal effects of the policy change on crime, I implement a staggered
difference-in-differences strategy. I compare criminal records for arrested individuals and
their known peers (identified as explained above) before and after the sweeps to the criminal
records of other group offenders. By doing so, I estimate the treatment effects of the gang
sweeps. I do so for both the direct and indirect impacts of the sweeps. I follow a similar
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strategy to study crimes and other relevant socioeconomic factors in a broader sense. In this
case, I define a treatment indicator at the area level, which takes a value equal to one for
the districts in which a sweep took place. This allows me to analyze its effects on crimes
regardless of whether individuals were arrested and to examine other welfare determinants
as well.
I also take advantage of the retrieved network structure to estimate peer effects. I do so
by following Lee et al. (2020), who developed a methodology that addresses the concerns of
peer effect estimates derived from potential identification and endogeneity issues. I also use
these peer effect estimates to identify key players in each gang. The key player in a criminal
group is the individual that leads to the largest crime reduction in aggregate crime when
removed (Ballester et al. 2006). To identify these key players, I rank individuals in each
gang according to the centrality measure proposed by Ballester and Zenou (2014). Finally,
I conduct a counterfactual policy exercise in which I compare the variation in crime caused
by the sweeps with the theoretical prediction of a policy that removes the key players. Since
the sweeps were of a larger scale, I cannot compare them with a scenario in which I remove
one individual. For this reason, I construct a predictive Cumulative Crime Reduction (CCR)
measure as a function of the number of key players removed. I compare the contraction in
crime after the sweeps with this CCR benchmark.
The results indicate significant reductions in the criminal activity of those arrested in the
sweeps and of their peers. Specifically, for arrested offenders, there was an average reduction
in criminal activity of 96%. This effect was immediate and persistent and is consistent with
the incapacitation of these individuals, as they were in jail in the post-sweep period. For
peers, there was also a significant reduction in criminal activity of up to 25%. For peers,
the effect faded out within a year of the police intervention. No heterogeneity in peers was
found in relation to age or nationality. The contraction in crime involved crimes against
the person but not against property. This suggests that lower activity is due to a loss from
the criminal environment (“bad influences”) rather than a loss of criminal capital (“crime
machinery”). The evidence also suggests that the reduction in crime in peers is related to a
deterrence effect rather than a caution effect. This would imply that peers are committing
fewer crimes rather than being arrested less. Finally, I compare crime outcomes at the gang
level after the sweeps with a theoretical benchmark derived from a policy that would have
removed key players. For this, I estimate peer effects, identify key players, and compute the
predicted reduction in criminality as a function of the number of key players removed. The
results of this counterfactual policy exercise indicate that all sweeps arrested the key player.
However, if the sweeps had arrested most central individuals in the gang, the predicted crime
reduction would have been 50% higher.
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The results of this study clearly show that identifying and tackling a group of key players
in each gang can lead to substantial improvements in police interventions. Nonetheless,
there are issues that need addressing. Firstly, key player identification is informationally
costly as it requires detailed knowledge of the gang and thorough analysis. Secondly, key
player predictions are only valid in the short term, as they hold under an invariant network
assumption. Thirdly, the key player might be an unfeasible target in reality. Hence, a key
player strategy might not always be the optimal strategy for police forces. Despite these
drawbacks, the counterfactual exercise is a valuable benchmark with which to compare real
policies.
This study contributes significantly to the research on criminal networks in several ways.
Firstly, it provides a picture of the network structure of gangs, providing a better under-
standing of how these criminal groups act. Second, it gives new estimates of spillover and
peer effects on criminal activities. In this regard, it is similar to Philippe (2017), Bhuller
et al. (2018) and Lee et al. (2020), but it extends the research of peer effects on crime to a
context of gang crime. Due to the specific nature of these criminal groups and the relevance
of the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona as a gang enclave outside the American continent,
the outcomes provide new insights regarding peer effects and their implications for policy
analysis. This study goes further and makes use of such estimates to identify key players
in each gang in a similar line to Lindquist and Zenou (2014). This study is one of the
first to apply a key player analysis to real and worrisome criminal groups and to test the
long-standing yet little contrasted theoretical predictions on this subject. Thus, it sets one
of the first precedents uniting theory and practice in this regard. Thirdly, it contributes
to the public agenda by comparing crime-fighting strategies. On such an issue, Lindquist
and Zenou (2019) provided an overview of policy lessons. But there have been few studies
involving counterfactual policy exercises from which recommendations could be extracted.
Specifically, this paper speaks on how to improve the effectiveness of policy design consider-
ing well-established theoretical benchmarks. Such an issue is of immense relevance nowadays,
when police funding and interventions are in the spotlight.
More broadly, this paper fits into the growing literature of network analysis of criminal
groups. Although there is a vast list of theoretical contributions (see Jackson et al. (2017) for
a summary), many applications refer to adolescent petty crime (Patacchini and Zenou (2008),
Patacchini and Zenou (2012), Lee et al. (2020)). However, in recent years empirical criminal
network analysis has developed in line with increasing data availability. The contribution
of this paper mostly relates to this area. Closely related to this paper, Philippe (2017)
studied the effect of incarceration on non-caught co-offenders, and Lindquist and Zenou
(2014) performed an analysis of criminal groups in Sweden using rich administrative data.
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They also identified key players in such a criminal context. Studies on peer effects in several
criminal contexts (neighborhoods, residential areas, juvenile corrections centers, or among
the homeless) were carried out by Kling et al. (2005), Bayer et al. (2009), Damm and
Dustmann (2014), Corno (2017) and Bhuller et al. (2018). Other papers related to this
one are those of Grund and Morselli (2017) and Billings and Schnepel (2017). While the
former recreated the internal structure of a criminal gang in London and analyzed the role
of ethnicity, the latter analyzed the role of pre-incarceration social networks on recidivism.
Although this set of recent literature identifies causal estimates and is of high relevance to
the field, there is much room to contribute to this branch of research in terms of policy
design and evaluation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 deals with the tough-on-
crime approach towards crime prevention, and its application in the Metropolitan Area of
Barcelona. Section 3 presents the data under analysis. Section 4 introduces the methodology.
Section 5 presents the results of this research. Section 6 contains the concluding remarks.
2 How to tackle gangs? Policy answers
When designing crime-fighting strategies, different approaches are possible. Without being
too general, they can be split into two groups. The first and more traditional is labeled as
the hard approach. Starting in the 1970s, safety policies in the United States have followed
this “tough-on-crime” approach. Although within this framework there is heterogeneity
in the way such an approach is followed in each context, they share characteristics that
include police search and seizure, strict criminal codes, and severe sentences. The economics
literature has long emphasized the potential deterrence capacity of the justice system (Becker
1968; Ehrlich 1973). Empirical studies have confirmed the same: Levitt (1997) found that
tough sanctions deter criminal activity, while Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) found a
large deterrent effect of visible police presence on crime. However, more recent contributions
to the literature have shown that in many circumstances “tough-on-crime” measures can be
expensive (Lynch 1997), ineffective (Kovandzic et al. 2004) and discriminatory (Arora 2018).
As an alternative, innovative strategies to prevent crime have been carried out, in which new
societal agents play a key role. This second approach, loosely labeled as soft, focuses on
reducing crime-triggering disparities. Soft approaches are of importance in deprived areas,
where social interventions are most needed (Crowley 2013), and a strong police presence
may have a disruptive effect. Although these soft interventions are usually far less expensive
(Domı́nguez and Montolio 2019), outcomes may be perceived over longer timeframes (Lawless
et al. 2010), and interdisciplinary approaches (and coordination) are greatly needed. So,
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questions remain on the implementation of these approaches, and whether they can serve
different purposes and tackle different criminal profiles due to each one’s specificities.
2.1 The case of the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona
Gangs were detected for the first time in the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona (MAB) in
2002. Over the following decade, there was a steady increase in the presence of such criminal
groups. Their public notoriety increased significantly in 2004, after the murder of a teenage
boy2. In 2012, around 15 gangs were detected. In chronological terms, the first block to con-
solidate included the gangs known as the Latin Kings and Ñetas, linked to migratory flows
originating in Ecuador. The second block included the Black Panthers and Trinitarios, and
was linked to migratory flows from the Dominican Republic. The third block, composed by
Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 from El Salvador and Honduras was the last to consolidate.
Estimates indicate that while in 2003 there were around 70 members, after 2009 the number
of members stabilized at around 2,5003. Most members are young men between 12 and 25
years old. Although most of them trace their origins to Latin America, Spaniards and indi-
viduals of other nationalities are frequently involved as well4. The factors mentioned in the
sociological literature influencing involvement in gangs include, among others: social disor-
ganization, presence of gangs in the neighborhood, barriers or lack of social and economic
opportunities, lack of social capital, family disorganization, problems at school, and social-
ization in the street (e.g. Feixa 2012). However, the characteristics that most make gangs
deserve attention are their connection with criminal activities and the violence embedded in
their behavioral patterns.
The expansion of this social phenomenon was conditioned to the specific context in which
it occurred. Firstly, Spain underwent widespread demographic change in the 2000s. The ar-
rival of substantial migratory flows increased the percentage of the immigrant population
from less than 3.6% in the year 2000 to 14.3% in the year 20125. South America contributed
the most foreign citizens (around 350,000 individuals in 2012 and 300,000 in 2019). Sec-
ondly, there was an important change related to security enforcement. Between 1994 and
2008 the deployment of the Local Police (Mossos d’Esquadra) was carried out, replacing the
2For an overview see https://www.elperiodico.com/es/barcelona/20061127/confirmada-la-condena-por-
la-muerte-de-ronny-tapias-5404839
3https://www.eldiario.es/politica/bandas-juveniles-estancan-cataluna-pandilleros15572184.html
4It must be noted that group dynamics do not resemble those followed by groups in the United States nor
are the levels of crime and violence comparable either with the United States or Latin America. According
to Blanco (2012), they mostly follow behavioral patterns present in Ecuador. This refers to the organization
inside the group (hierarchical structure) but also regarding behavior outside the group and rivalries.
5In Catalonia such figures rise to 4.0% and 17.7% respectively. Source: National Institute of Statistics
https://www.idescat.cat/pub/?id=pmh
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National Police. This change meant that security forces in the MAB were mostly depen-
dent on the Local Government rather than on the Central Government and therefore had
more autonomy to set police strategies. Finally, victimization data (Public Safety Survey of
Catalonia, ESPC) shows that between 2004 and 2010, the prevalence of criminal incidents
in the population increased. Thus in 2004 16.3% of the people surveyed remembered being
victims of crimes, in 2010 this percentage had increased to 19.4%. Finally, according to the
Barometer of the City of Barcelona, among non-economic concerns, citizens saw insecurity
as the most concerning, with increasing weight given to this from 2007 onwards (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Main concerns for Barcelona residents, excluding the economy
Source: Own construction from Barometer of the City of Barcelona
It was in this context that the rise of gangs and criminal acts carried out by them took
place. Figure 2 illustrates the pattern in the first decade of the 21st century. The diagnosis
from the police side was one of being “worried but not alarmed”6.
6https://www.abc.es/espana/catalunya/abci-cataluna-tiene-jovenes-bandas-201107070000noticia.html
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Figure 2: Arrests of gang members in Catalonia
Source: Blanco (2012) based on General Police Directorate.
From a policy perspective, two very clear periods can be distinguished in the way the
Local Public Sector (Generalitat de Catalonia and Barcelona City Hall) decided to tackle
the existence and operation of gangs.
1. From 2004 until 2012 a lenient approach was followed. In 2004, Barcelona City Hall
commissioned a report on the gang situation (Feixa 2012). At this time, gangs were
given the possibility of moving towards integration and becoming legally recognized
associations7. This was intended to give them visibility, and for members joining the
associations to explicitly renounce the use of violence. Although this process had some
positive effects, most gang members did not welcome it, which caused the extent of the
newly created associations to quickly decrease (Blanco 2012; Córdoba Moreno 2015).
2. From 2012 a tougher approach was taken. In November 2011, with the approval of
Decree 415/2011, the Local Police created a specialized unit. The “central unit of
organized and violent youth groups” (UGOV8) was put in charge of the “investigation
of crimes that affect people’s life or health and those criminal activities carried out
by gangs”. This unit was created by shifting police resources from other jurisdictions
rather than from new hiring. Specifically, 30 community police officers already involved
in issues related to gangs in their jurisdictions were grouped at the central level and
reassigned exclusively to tackle them. As a result, a “zero tolerance” approach against
gangs was implemented: in addition to applying preventive measures, offensive ones
7The cultural association “Latin Kings and Queens of Catalonia” registered in July 2006 and the socio-
cultural association “Ñetas” did so in March 2007.
8Spanish acronym for Unidad central de Grupos juveniles Organizados y Violentos.
8
were taken. These offensives were based on gang sweeps or crackdowns, which consisted
of large-scale police interventions that arrested several and important gang members
in a coordinated fashion. This change in the Police was accompanied by stronger judi-
ciary enforcement. Act 6/2009 specified identifying conditions for group convictions,
which would lead to tougher judiciary outcomes for criminals than previously9. In
detail, Act 6/2009 sets out the criteria that police units must take into account when
assigning a criminal act to the activity of gangs. The acting police units must make
two evaluations: one to determine if the individual matches any of the indicators of
belonging to gangs listed in the police database of gangs and another one to determine
whether the criminal act committed is related or not to that militancy, for which a set
of indicators is specified.
Hence, as explained above, in 2012 there was a drastic change in the way the situation
regarding gangs was approached and tackled in the MAB. The new approach involved police
specialization, large sweeps and tougher judiciary enforcement. No other concurrent changes
in policy took place regarding gangs nor other criminal activities10. This context provides a
good scenario with which to assess the effectiveness of a sturdier punishment policy towards
gangs. It must be noted that the outcomes are due to the compound effect of concomitant
policy modifications (police and judiciary), as from the public sector viewpoint they were
coordinated and seen as one.
3 Data
This research first draws on a restricted-use administrative geocoded dataset of all registered
crimes in the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona (MAB) from 2008 to 2014. This dataset
was provided by the Local Police (Mossos d’Esquadra) and comprises information on all
formalized offenders during that period. It includes information on the exact time (yy-
mm-dd; hh-mm) and place of the crime (x-y geographical coordinates) as well as on the
type of crime, and some individual characteristics of the offenders (age, gender and country
of birth). Everyone is assigned a unique identifier (allowing them to remain anonymous),
making it possible to see how many times he/she was arrested over time. Additionally, by
exactly matching time, geographical coordinates and type of crime of individual registries,
I can identify which offenders were caught alongside others. This allows me to identify and
9The Act, although passed in June 2009, states that 18 months would be given to local governments
to identify relevant criminal groups, characteristics and actions that would lead to group convictions. As a
result, it was only in 2011 that it became applicable.
10No significant changes were found in patrolling hours nor in number of police units.
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thoroughly describe real criminal networks.
For this study I focus on the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona as it constitutes one of the
most important settings for Latin gangs outside the American continent. This relates to the
previously explained migration phenomenon that took place in the early 2000s in Spain, and
the attractiveness of large cities for the incoming population. The MAB is composed of 36
municipalities and comprises 4 million inhabitants. It is the fifth largest and the densest
Metropolitan Area in Europe. Within the MAB, the municipality of Barcelona is the largest
in terms of population and territory (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). Additionally, it is
one of the municipalities with the highest crime rates. In this regard, it is a well-established
fact that crime rates are much higher in big cities than smaller cities. Glaeser and Sacerdote
(1999) mentioned as causes higher pecuniary benefits, a lower probability of arrest and a
lower probability of recognition.
Secondly, I have information about all sweeps carried out by the UGOV unit. The unit
was created in 2012, and sweeps are still taking place. However, due to the availability of
criminal administrative police records only until 2014, I only consider sweeps carried out up
to that date. The exact date, geographical area of action and number of arrested individuals
are included in the records. During these first three years (2012–2014), several sweeps took
place, leading to 151 individuals being arrested11.
Using these two data sources, I build a panel dataset for the MAB at the individual-
quarter level for the 2008–2014 period. This includes 7,349,804 observations, coming from
262,493 individuals over 28 quarters. The panel includes individual information on whether
the individual was arrested by the police1213, and if so, information on how many times
they were arrested, how many of these were in a group and how many partners there were.
Demographic information about the individual as well as on the crimes committed is also
included. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.
11Due to the sensitivity of the data, it is not possible to disclose specific information on the sweeps.
12If not, a zero is imputed for the criminal actions committed by that individual in that quarter. This
allows to build a balanced panel.
13The information available gathers all records from the police, and suffers the issue of “dark figures”,
that is that it does not provide information about offenders who were not arrested. This is a common issue
when dealing with crime data, and it is difficult to resolve. However, the data used still provides a solid base
upon which to build this analysis.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, main variables
Individual Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Female 262,493 0.258 0.438 0 1
Spanish 262,493 0.577 0.494 0 1
Other European 262,493 0.127 0.333 0 1
African 262,493 0.087 0.282 0 1
American 262,493 0.163 0.370 0 1
Asian 262,493 0.046 0.209 0 1
Year of Birth 262,493 1976 12.979 1901 2000
Arrested 7,349,804 0.059 0.236 0 1
Times arrested 7,349,804 0.077 0.423 0 83
Times arrested in group 7,349,804 0.033 0.292 0 51
Known peers 7,349,804 0.082 1.623 0 307
Global Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Arrests 28 20,139 1,114 17,516 22,311
Arrested individuals 28 15,518 728 13,335 16,567
Group crimes 28 8,561 688 7,498 10,126
Source: Own construction from Catalan Police data
4 Methodology
My analysis focused on two different, yet complementary approaches. Firstly, I estimate the
effects of the sweep on criminality at the individual level. I do this for individuals arrested
in sweeps and their known criminal peers. I also evaluate changes in criminality at the gang
level. Additionally, I analyze the impact on other outcomes in the area where the sweep took
place. Secondly, I compare the results at the gang level with the predicted crime reduction
derived from a strategy that would remove key players in each gang. This counterfactual
policy exercise helped to set a discussion on the implementation of the sweeps.
4.1 UGOV sweeps’ analysis
In 2012 a tougher enforcement model for gangs was implemented in the Metropolitan Area
of Barcelona, under which several sweeps took place. Using the panel structure described in
the previous section, the main analysis in this subsection consists of estimating variants of
the following staggered difference-in-differences specification:
Crimeit = β0 + β1.Arrestedi + β2.P eeri + β3.Postit
+β4.(Arrested.Post)it + β5.(Peer.Post)it + ηi + φt + εit (1)
where the dependent variable Crimeit is an indicator variable showing whether the indi-
vidual was arrested, the number of times he was arrested, and the number of times he was
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arrested alongside others. Arrestedi is an indicator variable that takes a value equal to one
for individuals arrested by a sweep and Peeri is an indicator variable that takes a value
equal to one for individuals not arrested in sweeps but linked to gang members that were
arrested. Postit is an indicator variable that takes a value equal to one after each sweep and
is sweep-specific. ηi and φt are individual and year-quarter fixed effects respectively. The
observational unit is an ”individual-quarter” pair and the main coefficients of interest are
β4 and β5. The key identifying assumption in this setting is that being arrested in a sweep
is unrelated to the criminality of individuals when the sweeps took place. Moreover, in the
absence of the sweeps, the criminality of those arrested in the sweep would have changed
in the same way as for all others. I exclude from the main analysis individuals that only
commit crimes alone. Thus, control units are individuals that are arrested in groups but are
not part of any of the gangs arrested in the sweeps.
I also conduct event study exercises focusing either on the arrested individuals or known
peers. I perform fixed-effects regressions of the following type:
Crimeid = α + ηi + γ · Treatedi +
∑
d 6=−1
φd · (Treatedi · Timed)id + εid (2)
where the observational unit is an ”individual-time to intervention” pair (measured in quar-
ters), Treated indicates whether the individual was either Arrested or Peer as defined above,
and ηi are individual fixed effects. I estimate Treated·Time interactions, leaving Time = −1
as the reference period. Each of the φd coefficients quantifies the difference in criminal ac-
tivity between the Treated individuals and the control group relative to the period -1. The
coefficients {φ−D, ..., φ−2} identify anticipation effects, and coefficients {φ0, ..., φD} identify
dynamic treatment effects. This exercise allows me to check for the parallel trend assumption
but also to understand the post treatment dynamics of equation (1).
I also take a continuous treatment approach in addition to the one shown in equation
1. In this case Treati takes values ∈ [0,1] according to different criteria. The first criteria I
use attributes a value equal to one to arrested individuals and values ∈ (0,1] to known peers
based on the number of links to arrested offenders after a min-max normalization14, and zero
to all others. Hence:
Crimeit = β0 + β1.T reati + β2.Postit + β3.(Treat.Post)it + ηi + φt + εit (3)
14For example, for a peer that is linked to 11 arrested individuals, the treatment value is 11−122−1 = 0.476,





1 for individuals arrested in a sweep
∈ (0, 1] for known peers
0 for all others
Another criteria I take is to assign a [0,1] treatment indicator to individuals according to
different network centrality measures. In this setting, I consider outcomes regarding two
other centrality measures: closeness and alpha centrality15. While closeness relates to the
inverse average distance between one individual and all others (and as stated in Mastrobuoni
and Patacchini (2012) it is a good measure for how isolated individuals are), alpha-centrality
is a measure of the influence of the individual in the group (Bonacich 1987). I also consider
min-max normalization of these measures to restrict them to the [0,1] interval.
Finally, I run similar exercises at the gang level and at the area level where the sweeps
took place. The first set of exercises identifies the reduction in criminality at the gang level
after the sweep, and thus shows the effect on crime at a broader level. The second exercise
indicates whether there are other outcomes that change after sweeps took place, indicating
whether their benefits exceed those related to criminal outcomes.
4.2 How far were the interventions from the “most effective” ap-
proach? A comparison with a key-player targeting strategy
In a framework of crime and networks, “key players” can be identified. Although such
individuals can be defined in different ways, in all cases they play a crucial role. This relates
to the fact that they can connect nodes that are otherwise isolated, or they can increase
the number of links in the network. The seminal paper by Ballester et al. (2006) defined
the key player in a criminal group as the individual who when removed leads to the largest
reduction in the group aggregate crime. Their main result indicates that a strategy that
removes the key player leads to the highest reduction of overall criminal activity compared
to removing any other individual. Besides their significant contribution to the literature on
networks and crime, Ballester et al. (2006)’s results have significant implications for policy
design. Specifically, a key-player targeting approach might lead to substantial reductions in
the activity of criminal networks at a fraction of the cost of large-scale interventions.
Taking the previous points into consideration, I carry out a counterfactual policy exercise
in which I compare the change in criminal outcomes at the gang level as a consequence of
the sweeps in the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona with the predicted variation in criminality
15See Appendix for a full Social Network Analysis and its dimensions
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when removing key players in each gang as in the model by Ballester and Zenou (2014). To
do so I (1) estimate peer effects in criminality for the gangs under analysis, (2) build a key
player ranking inside each gang according to the centrality measure proposed by Ballester
and Zenou (2014), (3) compute the predicted reduction in criminality at the gang level as a
function of the number of key players removed and (4) compare those predictions with the
outcomes observed following the sweeps.
4.2.1 Peer effect estimates
The first step to determine the predicted reduction in criminality at the group level involves
computing peer effects in criminality. This parameter is needed to measure the centrality
of each individual within the gang and to rank them. In this setting, agents choose how
many crimes to commit in order to maximize their own utility, which depends on the crime
profile of all agents in the gang and on its architecture. In this game the utility function of
individual l i is given by
ui(y,G) = αiyi + φ
n∑
j=1
gijyi.yj − cyi − 1/2y2i (4)
The utility function has a cost-payoff structure as in Becker (1968), where the payoff is given
by the first two terms and the cost by the latter two. yi is the criminal outcome of individual
i, αi reflects individual heterogeneity of crime productivity
16, and gij is an indicator variable
that takes a value of one if individuals i and j are linked and zero otherwise.
In equilibrium, each agent maximizes his/her utility and the best-reply function can be
written in matrix form as
Y = φGY + β0 +Xβ1 + X̄β2 + u (5)
where Y is a vector of the individual outcomes (crimes), G is a diagonal adjacency matrix17,
GY is a vector of the individual outcomes for peers, X is a vector of agents’ characteristics
and X̄ is a vector of peers’ average characteristics. Peer effects are given by φ, β1 captures
observable individual heterogeneity and β2 reflects the contextual effects.
16αi = β0 +Xiβ1 + X̄iβ2 + ui, where X is a vector of observable exogenous characteristics and X̄ is the
average exogenous characteristics of agent i’s connections
17Specifically, each element gij indicates whether individuals i and j were arrested together.
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4.2.1.1 Threats to identification and solution
The identification of peer effects is not straightforward and suffers several problems. The
first of these is the well-known reflection problem (Manski 1993). Such an issue arises from
the simultaneity in the choices and outcomes of peers, which in turn makes it impossible
to distinguish separately peer effects from contextual effects. The second potential issue is
the fact that the observed gang is presumed to be endogenous. When this is the case it is
not possible to identify whether the correlation of behavior among peers is a result of the
network or just of homophily (similar observable characteristics).
As stated in Lee et al. (2020), both issues can be solved by an Instrumental Variables
approach in three stages. Firstly, the observed adjacency matrix G needs to be replaced by a
predicted adjacency matrix Ĝ. The latter is based on exogenous covariates of the individuals.
A logistic regression model on link formation is estimated considering matches on available
observable characteristics, and a predicted probability of link formation is obtained for each
element of Ĝ. Secondly, peers’ criminal outcomes (GY in equation 5) are regressed against
the IV matrix Ẑ = [1, X, ˆ̄X, Ĝ1, ĜX, Ĝ ˆ̄X]. Thirdly, equation 5 is run with the predicted
value of GY .
4.2.2 Centrality measure and key player ranking
Once peer effects are adequately identified and estimated, it is possible to compute the cen-
trality of each individual in each gang. In order to compute such a measure two assumptions
are made. First, that the gang is fixed. This implies assuming it does not vary after an
individual is removed, meaning no rewiring or new link formation. Second, that the criminal
productivity of each individual (previously described as αi) does not depend on the gang.
As mentioned earlier, the key player is the individual that once removed from the gang
leads to the largest reduction in crime. Formally, this implies max{Y ∗(r, φ)− Y ∗(r−i, φ)}.
For all gangs r and for all individuals i, Ballester and Zenou (2014) proposed a “contextual
intercentrality measure” that considers (1) a network effect, derived from the centrality
measured proposed by Ballester et al. (2006). This effect captures the direct effect on
delinquency after the removal of an individual and the change in the gangs structure when
an individual is removed. And (2) a contextual effect, derived from the removal of an
individual but keeping the gang unchanged. This measure is built as follows:




+ bα(r, φ)− bα〈i〉(r, φ) (6)
where α〈i〉 = (Xi, α
[−i])′ describes the situation in which the contextual vector α is computed
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from the network r when individual i is removed, that is r[−i], and α[−i] is the vector α after
removing individual i. bα,i(r, φ) is the centrality of individual i in network r. mji and mii are
the corresponding elements of matrix M = (I − φG)−1 =
∑∞
k=0 φ
kGk. M tracks the number
of walks in network r starting from i and ending in j, where walks of length k are weighted
by φk.
After computing this centrality measure, it is possible to rank individuals in each gang
in decreasing order. This allows key players to be identified.
4.2.3 Predicted reduction in criminality and policy comparison
Lindquist and Zenou (2014) showed that the predicted crime reduction in each gang r after
removing an individual i (CRir) is equal to 100 times the centrality of this individual divided





As equation (7) indicates, as δi(r, φ, α) is highest for the key player in each gang, so is the
crime reduction at the gang level. However, it must also be noted that equation 7 computes
the predicted crime reduction when a single individual is removed from the gang. For this
reason, by itself it is not a good benchmark with which to compare the outcomes of the
sweeps as they were of a larger scale.
In order to compare the prediction of the model with the observed outcome in an in-
formative way, I perform a sequential removal exercise in which the result is the predicted
crime reduction as a function of the number of individuals removed, ranked by centrality.
Specifically, the predicted cumulative crime reduction in each gang r after removing up to
individual n when sorted by centrality (CCRnr) is defined as
CCRnr = CR1r + CR2r(1− CR1r) + ...+ CRnr(1− CR1r − ...− CR(n−1)r) (8)
Firstly, this requires computing the predicted crime reduction when the key player is re-
moved as in equation (7). Secondly, the additional reduction when removing the second-top-
ranked individual is determined by computing their centrality over the remaining criminal
activity after the first individual is removed. The second exercise is performed as many times
as there are individuals in the gang. As a result, a map of the predicted crime reduction at
the gang level as a function of the number of “key players” removed is obtained. Such pre-
dictions are compared with those observed after the sweeps. The resulting deviation speaks
in terms of the effectiveness of the interventions.
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5 Results
5.1 Analysis of UGOV’s sweeps
Out of the 151 individuals arrested in the sweeps, 127 individuals were identified in the data.
The difference in numbers reflects the fact that some of these individuals were not caught
in the MAB (but in other areas of Catalonia), and the last operation took place in the last
quarter of 2014, and therefore did not have a post-intervention period for comparison. For
those 127 individuals identified, 413 first-order peers were identified, matching them in date,
time, geographical coordinate and type of crime in records on arrests. As a result, a total of
540 individuals are considered treated by UGOV’s sweeps, either directly or indirectly.
The network structure of the individuals involved is shown in Figure 3. This graph
presents the network structure of individuals arrested in the sweeps and first-degree known
peers. Each dot is an individual; darker dots are individuals arrested in the sweeps whereas
lighter dots are peers. Each line between individuals indicates that those two individuals
had committed at least one crime together before the sweeps.
Figure 3: Recovered criminal gang structure, before sweeps
Note: This graph presents the network structure of individuals arrested in the sweeps and first degree known
peers. Each dot is an individual and each line indicates a link between individuals. Source: Own construction
from Local Police data.
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A description of the data used in this analysis is presented in Table 2, indicating the
observed characteristics of the individuals under analysis and the peer averages. As expected,
individuals involved in UGOV sweeps were to a large extent young males born in Latin
America18. Table 3 shows the results of balancing tests regarding crime characteristics for
treated (arrested individuals and peers) and control individuals. This data indicates that
while there may be differences in the number of crimes committed by treated individuals
in comparison to control individuals, it is not possible to rule out the possibility that the
variation the number of crimes is the same for both groups. This data therefore provides
the first piece of evidence in favor of the parallel trend assumption holding in this context.
Table 2: Data description – characteristics of individuals arrested in
sweeps and their known peers
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Own characteristics
Female 0.124 0.330 0 1
Spanish 0.298 0.458 0 1
Latin 0.622 0.485 0 1
Age 22.406 7.016 13 63
# Crimes 4.526 4.737 1 30
Peers 12.826 12.673 1 77
UGOV-arrested 0.235 0.425 0 1
Peer characteristics
Female 0.091 0.162 0 1
Spanish 0.289 0.267 0 1
Latin 0.636 0.298 0 1
Age 22.012 4.632 14 41
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics for the 540 individuals linked to UGOV
sweeps. Source: Administrative data of the Catalan Police.
18See Figure A2 in the Appendix for homogeneity measures inside gangs for the largest sweeps in the
sample.
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Table 3: Balancing tests on crime for treated and control individuals
Treated Control Diff Std. Err. p-value
Panel A: Level
All crimes 0.107 0.086 0.021 0.008 0.007
Group crimes 0.068 0.056 0.012 0.006 0.042
Against property 0.063 0.042 0.021 0.005 0.000
Against person 0.027 0.030 -0.003 0.004 0.538
Other 0.017 0.014 0.003 0.003 0.369
Panel B: Variation
All crimes -0.050 -0.047 -0.003 0.005 0.569
Group crimes -0.041 -0.037 -0.004 0.004 0.325
Against property -0.026 -0.026 0.000 0.004 0.942
Against person -0.021 -0.021 0.000 0.003 0.888
Other -0.011 -0.011 0.000 0.002 0.941
Note: This table presents balancing tests for criminal characteristics (number of crimes
and crime variation) before the UGOV sweeps took place, between treated and control
individuals. Source: Own construction from Barcelona City Hall and Catalan Police
data.
5.1.1 Baseline estimates
Baseline estimates of Eq.(1) are presented in Table 4. Estimates are done for individuals
arrested in the sweeps as well as known peers. The probability of committing a crime, the
total number of crimes for which they were caught and the number of group crimes for which
they were caught are shown. Control individuals are those arrested in groups but are not
part of any of the gangs arrested in the sweeps.
In all cases, the results show a significant decrease in criminality after the sweeps. In the
case of arrested individuals, the probability of committing a crime was reduced by almost
half, while the number of crimes was reduced by 95%. For peers, reductions in criminality
were of a smaller magnitude (26%) but also significant. Considering only crimes committed
by groups the decreases in crime were even higher.
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Table 4: Baseline estimates - effects of sweeps on crime
P(crime) Total crimes Group crimes
Arrested·Post -1.782*** -0.350*** -0.302***
(0.211) (0.028) (0.023)
Peer·Post -0.469*** -0.048*** -0.051***
(0.117) (0.019) (0.015)
Obs. 3,544,535 3,544,535 3,544,535
Indiv. 126,968 126,968 126,968
i FE Y Y Y
t FE Y Y Y
% change arrested -44% -95% -99%
% change peers -12% -26% -43%
Notes: This table reports the results of the difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation
following Eq. (1) for the 2008-2014 period. Each row presents estimates for different
groups: arrested individuals and peers. The first column indicates the results for the
probability of committing a crime, column two indicates the total number of crimes
and column three indicates the number of group crimes. The observational unit is
an individual–quarter pair and only individuals ever arrested in a group crime were
included. Treated units are arrested individuals or peers. Treatment timing differed
across individuals, according to the timing of the sweep. The coefficient shown is that of
interest in a DiD setting, being Treated ·Post for Arrested and Peer. Robust standard
errors are shown in parentheses. p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Event study exercises allow effects to be seen over time. For arrested individuals the
reduction in crime was drastic and immediate. Moreover, this reduction persisted after 1.5
years. For peers, a different pattern arose. The effect seemed to be short-lived as after one
year the reduction in criminality was no longer significant. This pattern may relate to the
average time taken to resolve a process legally. According to statistics from the Spanish
Judiciary System, in Catalonia the average timescale for “brief procedures” is 9.8 months
or 7.1 for procedures involving minors19. For peers the reduction in crime was no longer
significant around this timescale.
19The statistics are provided at the regional level, thus the Catalan average is used to approxi-




Figure 4: Event study exercise on the effects of sweeps on crime. 95% Confidence intervals.
(a) Total crimes of arrested individuals (b) Group crimes of arrested individuals
(c) Total crimes of peers (d) Group crimes of peers
Notes: This graph reports the results of an event study exercise following Eq. (3) for total crimes (left panel)
and group crimes (right panel). Results are presented for arrested individuals (upper panel) and peers (lower
panel). The observational unit is an individual-quarter pair. Treated units are defined as in section 4.1, while
treatment timing differed across units, according to intervention timing. Confidence intervals are based on
robust standard errors.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
I also analyze the previous outcomes in terms of individual characteristics. The results
are presented in Table 5 both for individuals arrested in the sweeps and their peers. These
results indicate that for arrested individuals the reduction in total criminality was larger for
offenders who were underage, male and non-Latin. However, no differences in outcomes were
found for group crimes. Regarding peers, for total crimes as well as for group crimes, there
appeared to be differences in outcomes only by gender: female offenders showed a larger
decrease in crime following sweeps.
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Table 5: Heterogeneity estimates - effects of sweeps on crime



















Notes: This table reports the results of the difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation
following Eq. (1) for the 2008-2014 period. Each row presents estimates for different
groups: arrested individuals and peers by heterogeneous individual characteristics.
The first column indicates the results for the total number of crimes and the second
column indicates the results for the number of group crimes. The observational unit
is an individual-quarter pair and only individuals ever arrested in a group crime were
included. Treated units are defined arrested individuals or peers. Treatment timing
differed across units, according to the timing of the sweep. The coefficient shown is
that of interest in a DiD setting , being Treated · Post for Arrested and Peer. Robust
standard errors are shown in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The network structure remaining after the sweeps indicates that some crime structures
persisted after the sweeps, which is consistent with the fact that the level of crime reduction
for peers was smaller and short term. However, the network graph was much smaller and
sparse than before in terms of number of observed individuals but also importantly in terms
of criminal links. Before the sweeps 540 individuals (127 arrested and 413 peers) and 3,463
links were identified. Afterwards, 101 individuals were arrested (14 arrested in sweeps and
87 peers), and 101 links were found between them20.
Finally, I analyze results at the gang level. These indicate that one year after the sweeps,
criminal activity at the gang level had reduced by 61% compared to the year before.
20See Figure A3 in the Appendix for a comparison of before and after network graphs.
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5.1.2 Continuous treatment estimates
For the continuous treatment estimates two approaches are followed. In the first, the number
of links to arrested individuals is considered in a min-max standardized way as described in
section 4.1. The second approach takes two network centrality measures amongst arrested
individuals and peers: alpha-centrality and closeness. The first is a measure of the influence
of a node in a network, and the second measures the average length of the shortest path
between the node and all other nodes in the graph.
In all cases, the higher the centrality measure, the higher the crime reduction. The results
indicate that an increase of one link to the arrested individual reduced total crimes by 13%.
In the network centrality measures approach, the results went in the same direction of crime
reduction but the magnitudes differed: a one standard deviation increase in alpha-centrality
reduced crimes by 3.2%, whereas for closeness there was a 2% reduction21.
21Differences between these results correspond to the fact that each centrality measure reflects different
issues. While closeness shows how many steps are needed to access every other node (0.11 standard deviation)
reflecting not only how many links an individual has but also how far it is from others, alpha centrality
contemplates an individual’s own connectedness and also that of its peers, providing a notion of the power
of the node in the network (0.08 standard deviation).
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Table 6: Continuous treatment estimates - effects of sweeps on crime
P(crime) Total crimes Group crimes
Panel A: number of links -2.126*** -0.360*** -0.315***
(0.232) (0.029) (0.023)
% change -5.3% -13.0% -11.4%
Panel B: alpha-centrality -1.501*** -0.224*** -0.204***
(0.151) (0.025) (0.020)
% change -3.7% -3.2% -2.9%
Panel C: closeness -1.172*** -0.156*** -0.143***
(0.120) (0.019) (0.015)
% change -2.9% -2.0% -1.9%
Obs. 3,544,535 3,544,535 3,544,535
Indiv. 126,968 126,968 126,968
i FE Y Y Y
t FE Y Y Y
Notes: This table reports the results of the difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation
following Eq. (1) for the 2008-2014 period. Each panel presents estimates for differ-
ent continuous treatment indicators: number of links, alpha-centrality and closeness
measures. The first column indicates the results for the probability of committing a
crime, column two indicates the total number of crimes and column three indicates the
number of group crimes. The observational unit is an individual–quarter pair and only
individuals ever arrested in a group crime were included. Treated units are defined as
individuals who were either arrested or a peer, with heterogeneous treatment intensity
according to each measure. Treatment timing differed across units, according to the
timing of the sweep. The coefficient shown is that of interest in a DiD setting, being
Treated · Post. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Robust standard
errors shown in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Event study exercises using the number of links, alpha-centrality and closeness measures
indicated a similar pattern for all crimes and group crimes as in Figure 422. For all three the
reduction in criminality was immediate but decreased over time. However, after six quarters
the effects were still present.
22See Figure A4 Appendix for the same exercise considering continuous treatment measures.
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5.1.3 Mechanism analysis
Regarding the potential mechanism that may underlie the results described above, I focus on
the peers, because for individuals arrested in the sweep the evidence suggests that there is
a mechanical effect driven by incapacitation. The data under analysis only shows outcomes
for a relatively short time span, when it is very likely that the arrested individuals were
in prison. This relates to the fact that Act 6/2009 that accompanied the sweeps increased
the probability of them going into preventive prison while waiting trial and that the penal
process takes an average of 9.8 months in Catalonia. Moreover, those arrested in the sweeps
are seized for crimes labeled as serious offences, which in the Spanish Penal Code means at
least 5 years in prison. For peers, the reduction in the number of times they were arrested
can be attributed to several factors that are not mutually exclusive, as discussed below.
5.1.3.1 Criminal capital vs. criminal environment
The first factor that affects the peers’ actions is the fact that after an arrest in the sweeps,
there is less incentive to commit a crime. This may be due to either a loss in “criminal human
capital” that hinders new criminal activity, or to a loss in “criminal environment” that deters
otherwise attractive criminal activities. As stated by Philippe (2017), the former relates to
criminal activities that require specialization, knowledge and planning. This specialization
is a priori more likely for crimes against property, such as burglary, theft or forgery. In
contrast, the latter derive from impulsive behaviors. This is more likely to take place in
vandalism, or violent crimes such as injuries or fights.
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Table 7: Crime heterogeneity - UGOV sweeps
Against Property Against Person Other crimes
Arrested·Post -0.113*** -0.062*** -0.175***
(0.019) (0.014) (0.019)
Peer·Post -0.017 -0.034*** 0.002
(0.016) (0.007) (0.005)
Obs. 3,544,535 3,544,535 3,544,535
Indiv. 126,968 126,968 126,968
i FE Y Y Y
t FE Y Y Y
% change arrested -83% -73% -123%
% change peers -15% -76% 8%
Notes: This table reports the results of the difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation
following Eq. (1) for the 2008-2014 period. Each row presents estimates for different
groups: arrested individuals and peers. The first column indicate results for the number
of property crimes, column two indicates results for the number of crimes against the
person and column three indicate results for all others. The observational unit is
an individual–quarter pair and only individuals ever arrested in a group crime were
included. Treated units are arrested individuals or peers. Treatment timing differed
across individuals, according to the timing of the sweep. The coefficient shown is that
of interest in a DiD setting, being Treated for Arrested and Peer. Robust standard
errors are shown in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
When analyzing outcomes by type of crime, those that were mostly reduced are labeled as
“others” for those arrested (since this category includes drug crimes as well as those labeled
as “criminal organization”). For peers, personal crimes (crimes against the person include
gender violence, sexual assault, injuries, threats) were the only crimes showing a significant
reduction, with no difference found for property crimes such as robberies, motor thefts or
burglaries23. This indicates that the mechanism of lost criminal capital had no effect on the
incidence of these crimes. On the contrary, there was a reduction in the number of crimes
labeled as injuries, threats or sexual assault. Such outcomes, of a more impulsive nature,
support the hypothesis of a reduction in the criminal environment. However, it was not
possible to distinguish whether this reduction was taking place between or within gangs.
5.1.3.2 Updated costs of sanctions
The second factor that may lead to a reduction in crime for peers relates to a more salient
risk of getting arrested. According to Philippe (2017), if there is indeed an increase in the
perceived costs of sanctions, offenders with shorter criminal careers should be more affected as
they gain new information, whereas for more prolific criminals no new information is received.
23See Table A1 in the Appendix for a more exhausive division of crime categories.
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Results on the probability of committing a new crime are presented in Table 8, where the
effect is distinguished according to the individuals’ position in the distribution of committed
crimes. For this exercise I follow a triple differences strategy (treatment/time/crime level)
and found no significant difference is found between high and low offenders, considering
different thresholds for what is defined as a high offender (above median, 75, 90, 95 and 99
percentiles).
Table 8: Crime heterogeneity for peers by criminal experience - UGOV
sweeps
Above median Above 75pc Above 90pc Above 95pc Above 99pc
Peer·Post -0.192 -0.280 -0.559*** -0.417*** -0.471***
(0.250) (0.197) (0.155) (0.125) (0.117)
Peer·Post·High -0.354 -0.292 0.212 -0.399 0.320
(0.283) (0.245) (0.237) (0.352) (1.518)
Obs. 3,551,548 3,551,548 3,551,548 3,551,548 3,551,548
Indiv. 126,841 126,841 126,841 126,841 126,841
i FE Y Y Y Y Y
t FE Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: This table reports the results of a triple difference estimation for the 2008-2014
period applied to the probability of committing a crime for peers. Treatment, timing
and criminal intensity are the differences considered. Each column presents different
estimates according to which threshold is taken to define high crime offenders.The
observational unit is an individual–quarter pair and only individuals ever arrested in a
group crime were included. Treated units are peers. Treatment timing differed across
individuals, according to the timing of the sweep. The coefficient shown is that of
interest in a triple DiD setting, being Treated ·Post ·High for Peer. Robust standard
errors are shown in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
5.1.3.3 Targeting vs. profiling
A third issue to be tackled regarding the previous set of results is whether they are driven
by a profiling strategy carried out by the police. This would imply that individuals similar
in demographic characteristics to those involved in gangs would also show a change in the
incidence of arrest. To check this, I compare arrests made before and after UGOV’s creation
in individuals with the set of characteristics (age, gender, nationality) that matches that
of arrested individuals in the sweeps, with arrests of individuals with a different set of
characteristics (age, gender, nationality) but that are also perceived as belonging to “high
crime” subpopulations. The results of this regression showed no statistically significant
differences between groups24. Hence, the results point towards a targeting strategy rather
than a profiling one.
24See Table A2 in the Appendix.
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5.1.3.4 Less crime vs. less caught
Another potential concern is that peers still commit crimes but are more careful when doing
so. Previous results by typology indicate that those crimes that are reduced are mostly
those associated with impulsive rather than planned behavior. This would indicate that the
hypothesis supporting an avoidance of detection might not be in place. Secondly, the nature
of the administrative data also goes against this hypothesis as records are based on the date
the crime and not the detention took place. Hence, they cover both “red handed” criminals
and those that avoided detection for a period but were then caught. Moreover, Lindquist
and Zenou (2014) stated that the longer the period under analysis, the more difficult it is
for all active peers to systematically avoid detection. They found very similar results when
using either a 3- or a 6-year window for the post-crime period.
5.1.3.5 Differential effect of sweeps vs. any arrest
Finally, there is the possibility that UGOV sweeps act in the same way as any other police
intervention towards gangs. If this were the case, the estimated effects would be the same
as those of just arresting these individuals. To overcome such an issue, I identify criminal
groups with similar characteristics to those arrested by the sweeps, but that were arrested
before 2012 (and the creation of the unit). For the period 2008–2011, five similar group
arrests were found that accounted for 64 individuals (versus the 127 identified by UGOV
arrests) and 56 peers (versus the 413 identified linked to those arrested by UGOV). For these
groups I perform the same analysis as in the baseline estimates, while adding a term that
accounts for whether the individual was linked to a sweep or not. If this latter term were
to demonstrate statistical significance, it would indicate that the toughening of the crime
fighting strategy of the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona derived from the sweeps and Act
6/2009 had a differential effect on the criminal outcome of those arrested and their known
peers.
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 9 and indicate a significant reduction
in the criminal activity of arrested individuals and their known peers regardless of whether
they were linked to a sweep or to another arrest with similar characteristics and prior to the
creation of the unit. This is true both for the total number of crimes and those committed in
groups. Moreover, the triple interaction term indicates that for those individuals arrested in
the sweeps there was a significant negative differential: the reduction in the criminal activity
of individuals arrested in the sweeps was significantly higher than that of individuals arrested
in similar interventions previously. Hence, after the change in the crime fighting policy, there
was a greater decrease in the criminality of those arrested, indicating that the toughening
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of the strategy was more successful than the previous strategy at reducing crime. However,
the opposite was the case for known peers: peers of individuals arrested by sweeps seemed
to show a lower crime reduction than the peers of previous interventions. This may relate
to the fact that the peers of those arrested in the sweeps were more prolific criminals that
the peers of those arrested in pre-UGOV interventions.
Table 9: Baseline estimates - Differential effect of UGOV sweeps
P(crime) Total crimes Group crimes
Arrested·Post -1.636*** -0.217*** -0.224***
(0.247) (0.041) (0.035)
Peer·Post -0.878*** -0.169*** -0.155***
(0.262) (0.065) (0.055)
Arrested·Post· sweep -0.453 -0.145*** -0.087**
(0.343) (0.050) (0.041)
Peer·Post· sweep 0.422 0.126* 0.107*
(0.287) (0.068) (0.057)
Obs. 3,542,468 3,542,468 3,542,468
Indiv. 126,968 126,968 126,968
i FE Y Y Y
t FE Y Y Y
Notes: This table reports the results of a triple difference estimation for the 2008-
2014 period. Treatment, timing and sweeps are the differences considered. Each row
presents estimates for different groups: arrested individuals and peers. The first column
indicates the results for the probability of committing a crime, column two indicates
the total number of crimes and column three indicates the number of group crimes.
The observational unit is an individual–quarter pair and only individuals ever arrested
in a group crime were included. Treated units are peers. Treatment timing differed
across individuals, according to the timing of the sweep. The coefficient shown is that
of interest in a triple DiD setting, being Treated · Post ·High for Arrested and Peer.
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
5.1.4 Results for alternative empirical strategies
Very recently there have been several methodological contributions regarding treatment ef-
fect estimations in staggered difference-in-differences (DiD) settings such as the one stud-
ied here. Goodman-Bacon (2018) (and Bailey and Goodman-Bacon 2015) showed that a
DiD estimator is a weighted average of all possible two-group/two-period DiD estimators.
Moreover, in such a setting weights may even be negative for some units. To overcome
potential issues derived from negative weights, de Chaisemartin and d’Haultfoeuille (2019)
proposed another estimator that solves this issue. Results derived from an estimation fol-
lowing de Chaisemartin and d’Haultfoeuille (2019) did not differ significantly from the linear
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regression estimator presented previously25. This reflects the fact that negative weights are
not an issue in this analysis26, as the pure control group (individuals caught in group crimes
but not by sweeps) was sufficiently large.
Finally, I conduct several exercises allowing for different specifications of the baseline
estimates. Specifically, I modify the control group to consider criminals arrested for any
crime, crimes against the person, for other crimes, and for drug crimes. Additionally, I
estimate Eq.(1) with a Poisson regression. As the dependent variable in this analysis, namely
the number of total crimes, has the structure of count data, this type of modelling might
be better suited. The results generally held for both arrested individuals and peers across
specifications.













Arrested·Post -0.350*** -0.350*** -0.435*** -0.355*** -0.398*** 0.153***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.054) (0.033) (0.070) (0.035)
Peer·Post -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.067*** -0.036 -0.026 0.765***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.030) (0.054) (0.084)
Group Crimes
Arrested·Post -0.302*** -0.302*** -0.346*** -0.311*** -0.270*** 0.128***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.043) (0.026) (0.021) (0.035)
Peer·Post -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.066*** -0.031 -0.041 0.643***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.026) (0.040) (0.090)
Obs. 3,544,535 7,339,235 3,359,767 2,058,479 278,999 3,542,923
Indiv. 126,968 262,493 120,233 73,701 10,013 126,775
i FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
t FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: This table reports the results of the difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation for
the 2008-2014 period. Each row presents estimates for different groups: arrested individuals
and peers. Each column indicates a different specification, considering different control
groups for columns 2 to 5 and a Poisson model in column 6. The observational unit is an
individual–quarter pair and only individuals ever arrested in a group crime were included.
Treated units are peers. Treatment timing differed across individuals, according to the timing
of the sweep. The coefficient shown is that of interest in a DiD setting, being Treated ·Post
for Arrested and Peer. Robust standard errors showed in parentheses. p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
25See Figure A5 in the Appendix
26Concretely, no negative weights were identified in this setting.
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5.1.5 Area Level Outcomes
Previous evidence shows that sweeps reduce most criminality indicators of those individuals
arrested and also of their known peers. Moreover, the magnitude of such reductions is sizable,
negative and statistically significant.
I therefore examined the impact of sweeps at a broader level. To do so, I look at the
evolution of different outcomes in the area in which the sweeps took place. For the case
of Barcelona, I consider districts as areas of influence (10 districts), whereas for the other
municipalities I consider each as a whole (35 municipalities). To analyze the impact of
sweeps, I follow a fixed-effects model with an AR(1). The data on registered crimes and
other socioeconomic outcomes are presented in Table 11.
Regarding crime outcomes, no significant change was found for overall crime in areas after
a sweep took place, and the same was true for all property crime. Statistically significant
decreases were found for crimes against the person, damage to property, injuries, and family
crimes. These results may reflect the lower presence of criminals and criminal groups in
the area, as these crime typologies are particularly sensitive to their presence. Finally,
although there was a reduction in threats, disobedience and drug crimes, the reduction was
not statistically significant.
Regarding other potential outcomes at the area level, benefits in the area exceeded those
of a crime reduction for certain typologies and involved other socioeconomic variables. Table
11 indicates that there were indeed important changes in the area. Regarding educational
outcomes, there was no effect on high-school enrollment in the areas in which there were
UGOV interventions. However, there was a positive and significant effect on the number
of students enrolled in the appropriate year for their age (non-lagged students). Moreover,
there was a significant and negative decrease in the number of admissions to Emergency
Rooms in the areas in which there were UGOV sweeps. Although it is not possible to link
either of these results with individuals or certain profiles, they indicate an improvement in
these variables. Finally, no effect was found on rental markets (either for prices or number
of contracts).
31
Table 11: Area level outcomes: crime and other socioeconomic variables
Crimes against property
Property Motortheft Robbery Damages
Treat·Post -0.372 -0.380 0.186 -0.198***
(2.907) (0.364) (0.322) (0.069)
Obs. 850 850 850 850
Areas 45 45 45 45
Area FE Y Y Y Y
Crimes against person
Person Injuries Family Threats
Treat·Post -0.276* -0.200** -0.032** -0.058
(0.156) (0.079) (0.015) (0.043)
Obs. 850 850 850 850
Areas 45 45 45 45
Area FE Y Y Y Y
Other crimes
Other Disobedience Drugs Arson
Treat·Post -0.190 -0.114 -0.068 -0.008**
(0.175) (0.081) (0.064) (0.004)
Obs. 850 850 850 850
Areas 45 45 45 45
Area FE Y Y Y Y
Other outcomes
Rent prices HS enrollment Non-lagged students ER admissions
Treat·Post -7.181 -51.423 2.405** -15.711*
12.215 57.42314 1.03 (9.178)
Obs. 180 180 111 190
Areas 36 36 37 10
Area FE Y Y Y Y
Notes: This table reports the results of the difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation follow-
ing Eq.(1) for the 2009-2014 period, incorporating an AR(1) disturbance term. Each column
presents results for different outcomes. The observational unit is an area-year pair. Treated
units are defined as those in which an UGOV sweep took place. The coefficient showed is
that of interest in a DiD setting, being Treated · Post . Robust standard errors are shown
in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
5.2 Key-player targeting benchmark
While the previous section analyzed the effect of the UGOV sweeps on the criminality of
arrested individuals and known peers, the aim of this section is to compare such outcomes
with those that network theory predicts would derive from targeting the key player in each
gang. To do this, I first estimate a peer-effects model, as described by Eq. (5). On the matter
of model estimation, and as previously explained, I consider the 3SLS estimator presented in
section 4.2 for Instrumental Variable regressions. For this, I obtain Ĝ by running a logistic
regression to predict link formation probabilities. For each potential link in each network
(that took empirical values of 0 or 1), the outcome is regressed on the match (difference)
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in each observable characteristic available (age, gender, nationality). For link formation
probabilities there is strong evidence of homophily as matches in characteristics increase the
probability of committing a crime together for the individuals under analysis27. However,
the McFadden’s pseudo-R2 of the logistic regressions was close to 0.04, indicating that the
dyadic characteristics were not very informative in predicting link formation. As a result
the IV matrix Ẑ constructed using the predicted adjacency matrix Ĝ is likely to be a weak
instrument.
The estimation results for Eq.(5) are reported in Table 12. The first column presents OLS
estimates, column 2 presents IV estimates with IV matrix Z, column 3 shows IV estimates
with IV matrix Ẑ, and column 4 presents GMM estimates. Regarding the estimates of
the first two columns, it is likely they may suffer from endogeneity issues, derived from
the reflection problem and the fact that the network itself is not exogenous. Moreover,
the overidentification test for the 2SLS-G estimation rejects the null hypothesis.Given these
issues, it its necessary to instrument the actual G matrix with a predicted Ĝ following the
link formation model previously shown, as in column 3. In this case, the validity of the
instruments was not rejected. However, a weak instruments issue is likely to be present and
therefore modeling the best response function by GMM may help tackle this issue.
The GMM estimate of peer effects is 0.00728, result that is smaller than in Lindquist and
Zenou (2014) and Lee et al. (2020). Here it must be noted that in both references the average
network size was considerably smaller than in the current study. Moreover, the first authors
conducted their analysis on suspected Swedish criminals, and the second ones did so in a
sample of adolescents in the US. These two different issues (network size and context) may
explain the differences in peer effect estimates. The one of this study implies that having
one criminal partner increases the number of crimes committed by an individual when alone
by 0.7% ( 1
1−φ̂). Moreover, considering that the average number of peers was 13, the average
network social multiplier would be of 10% ( 1
1−13φ̂).
27See Table A3 in the Appendix for outcomes of the link formation model.
28This result satisfies the condition for the existence of a unique equilibrium ( |φ̂|ρ(G) < 1), which in turn
allows the M matrix to be built.
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Table 12: Peer Effect Estimates
OLS 2SLS-G 3SLS GMM
φ 0.015*** 0.006 0.006 0.007**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Observations 540 540 540 540
R-squared 0.110 0.100 0.101 0.093
Own characteristics Y Y Y Y
Peer characteristics Y Y Y Y
First Stage F 389.24 210.18 210.18
OIR p-value 0.00 0.16 0.16
Notes: This table reports the results of the best reply function of the criminal networks
following Eq. (4). Each column presents results by different estimation methods. For
the third and fourth columns, Ĝ was constructed by using the outcomes of a logistic
model of link formation. In all cases individual characteristics as well as those of peers
were included as controls. The observational unit is the criminal. The coefficient of
interest (that of peer effects) is provided by φ. Robust standard errors are shown in
parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Under the invariant network assumption (that is, that the network does not rewire after
an agent is removed), the key player is the agent with the highest contextual intercentrality
measure in the network (Ballester and Zenou 2014). As explained by the authors, failure
to include contextual effects can lead to spurious inference on social network effects as in-
dividuals may adjust behavior because of common influences. Using the GMM estimates
reported, the contextual intercentrality measure can be calculated for each agent following
Eq.(6) and the key player can be identified for each network.
Regarding the key player themselves, they were caught in all the sweeps analyzed. In all
cases the key player was male, half of them were born in Latin America and 70% of them were
born in 1990 or later. The key players identified in the gangs did not differ significantly from
their peers in any demographic characteristics (age, gender or nationality). Moreover, there
were no significant differences either in the number of peers they had or in the number of
crimes for which they were caught. Therefore, key players are not distinguishable from other
agents if gang structure is not considered. Additionally, as in Lindquist and Zenou (2014)
and Lee et al. (2020), the key players were not those individuals with the highest values of
other centrality measures such as alpha-centrality, betweeness or closeness centrality. Hence,
common network centrality measures did not correctly identify the key player in Ballester
et al. (2006) either.
Finally, following Ballester and Zenou (2014) and Lindquist and Zenou (2014) it is possi-
ble to compute the predicted reduction in crime that would be achieved by removing the key
player. The model predicted that removing the key player would lead to a weighted average
crime reduction for the mean gang of 17.7%, an outcome that decreases with the size of
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the gang. As stated in Ballester et al. (2006), that would be the largest possible reduction
when targeting one individual in each gang. This fact is also verified in the current study:
on average targeting the key player would achieve a crime reduction that would outperform
targeting the most active criminal by 2.3%, targeting the most central individual (Bonacich
1987) by 2.9% and the most connected individual by 0.7%29. This set of results is consis-
tent with those of Lindquist and Zenou (2014) and Philippe (2017). Although some of the
current results differ from their results, the focus of the current study was on different types
of networks: youth criminal groups (Lindquist and Zenou 2014 considered all types of crime
and Philippe 2017 focused on pairs or groups of 7 or less). Hence, the outcomes and policy
comparisons may differ.
5.3 Discussion
When comparing the effect the UGOV sweeps’ with the predictions based on the removal
of the key player, several points are worth highlighting. Firstly, as already mentioned, all
sweeps caught the key player in the gang. Secondly, and as already mentioned, the sweeps
achieved a crime reduction of 61% in the year following the intervention. This reduction
was 3.4 times higher than that predicted after removing the key player and outperformed
the key player strategy by 43.3%. However, the comparison between the two strategies is
not as straightforward: while the prediction of the removal of the key player was based on
catching just one individual, sweeps affected more individuals30. Thirdly, it is possible that
treatment (being caught) was positively and significantly correlated with the intercentrality
measure of Ballester and Zenou (2014), indicating that such interventions on average catch
the most relevant individuals. Nonetheless, the match was not perfect: among those caught
only 60% were in the top of the intercentrality ranking of each gang31. Finally, performing
a sequential exercise by removing more than one key player32 indicates that according to
the predictions of the key player theory, a similar reduction in crime to that achieved by
the UGOV sweeps would have been achieved by removing the top six individuals according
to the generalized intercentrality ranking (a third of the average actually caught). The
29As in Lindquist and Zenou (2014) these values were computed as the difference between the two sce-
narios.
30They caught on average 18 individuals per gang, or 24% of the gang.
31Considering the top half, the match between caught and top intercentrality individuals was 90%. There-
fore, there was no mismatch among the top-rated individuals.
32In order to do so, I first computed the classical key player exercise: I removed the highest intercentrality
individual and estimated the predicted reduction in crime in the gang. After this, I computed the same
exercise for the second-ranked individual and computed the predicted crime reduction in the fraction of
crime that would remain after the removal of the first key player. I did this in several steps, as many as
there were individuals caught in each gang
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outcomes of the exercise also indicate that if instead of catching those actually caught the
UGOV would have caught the top ranked individuals by intercentrality (holding the number
of individuals caught constant), the predicted crime reduction would have been 92.8%. This
implies a 50% increase in reduced criminality compared to the one recorded. Hence, by
adequately identifying, targeting and catching the “key players” in each network, the UGOV
sweeps would have achieved the same crime reduction with a smaller deployment, or a larger
reduction in crime if resources were held constant.
Figure 5: Predicted reductions in criminality, by number of key players removed
Note: This graph presents the predicted crime reductions as a function of the number of agents removed,
ordered by intercentrality. Such outcomes were compared with the actual reduction achieved by UGOV
sweeps.
In terms of policy, two broad comparisons can be reflected on. The first involves the
targeting strategies. It is clear that removing the key player outperforms any other indi-
vidual targeting. However, it is also a more costly strategy in terms of information and
identification, since as mentioned the key player is not identifiable by either observable or
gang characteristics. The second comparison is that between targeting strategies and other
approaches, such as general tough-on-crime policies. In this case, the sweeps achieved a sig-
nificantly higher reduction in crime that that predicted by the key player theory. Nonetheless,
this strategy arguably involved a larger police deployment, and did not always catch the most
relevant individuals in terms of intercentrality. Indeed, by catching the “key players” in each
gang the sweeps would have achieved a 50% larger reduction in the criminal activity of the
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affected networks. From the analysis above it can be concluded that, in comparison with
the sweeps, removing only one key player would be less effective. However, identifying and
tackling a group of key players in each gang can lead to substantial improvements in the
crime reduction after police interventions.
Nonetheless, key player identification is informationally costly. It only makes sense to
consider such a policy if its benefits out-weigh the cost of collecting the data (if there is no
availability) and of data analysis (since as mentioned the key player is not easily identifiable
by sociodemographic, criminal or network characteristics). Secondly, under the invariant
network assumption, the key player predictions are only valid in the short term, as it is
unlikely for the remaining agents to form new links in the short period of time after the
removal of the key player. In the long run however, it is necessary to estimate a network
formation model to produce meaningful counterfactuals for the long-run key player analy-
sis. And thirdly, the key player might be an unfeasible target in reality. Given that the
criminal networks under study follow a well-defined internal structure rather than being a
decentralized unit, it is plausible that the key player is better protected than other agents in
the network, and hence would be more difficult for police resources to reach. Additionally,
networks would respond endogenously to the extraction of the key player by restructuring or
re-grouping in order to continue committing crime. Hence, a key player strategy might not
be the optimal strategy for police forces, if their cost is too high in terms of investment, or
not low enough in terms of police resources when compared with other tougher approaches.
Despite all these drawbacks, the exercise of removing the key player is a good benchmark
with which to compare actual policies because of its relevance and concluding whether it
would be worth moving towards a key player strategy may depend on the case.
However, this does not mean that tough-on-crime interventions or police specialization
such as the sweeps are always the approach to follow. Previous literature indicates how costly
these approaches may be in many dimensions. Firstly, the direct cost for the police in terms
of human resources, training and deployment. Secondly, the indirect costs to society, which
include individual costs related to the dangers of police profiling, the burden or stigma
for individuals and areas under intervention, and also the high human capital costs that
individuals may suffer as a result of being caught at such a young age and their very low
reinsertion prospects. Additionally, there is the broader discussion on whether the budget
assigned to such interventions could be shifted to other pressing issues still related to crime,




This study examines the implementation of gang sweeps addressed at dismantling them,
and their effects on criminality levels. The analysis considered the effects on both arrested
individuals and their known peers. I also study outcomes at the gang level and in the areas
in which the sweeps took place. To do so, I retrieved the structure of real criminal networks
from administrative records of the Local Police (Mossos d’Esquadra) from 2008 to 2014 and
performed the analysis using a difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy in the Metropolitan
Area of Barcelona (MAB). In this context, gangs were a big concern among authorities and
citizens, and a drastic change in policy towards them took place.
My results indicate significant reductions in the criminal activity of those arrested in the
sweeps and of their known peers. For the former there was an immediate and sharp drop in
criminal activity. This result, alongside average trial and prison times is consistent with an
incapacitation effect. In the case of peers, reductions in criminal activity were smaller, more
short term, and focused on crimes against the person. This points towards a mechanism
of loss of the criminal environment. At the area level, sweeps translate into significant
decreases in crimes against the person and disobedience against law officers. The results
also demonstrated a decline in the number of Emergency Room admissions and lagged High
School students.
The peer-effects estimations indicate that, on average, crime increases by 10% when
an individual is part of a gang compared to when committing crimes alone. Based on
this estimate, I ranked individuals in each gang by centrality, and I plotted the predicted
reduction in criminality as a function of the number of individuals removed. The results
indicated that as the same reduction in gang criminality achieved by the sweeps could have
been achieved by targeting on average a third of the individuals arrested.
Overall, the existence of peer effects suggests that any crime reduction may lead, through
reductions in peers’ crimes, to future reductions in crime, a benefit that needs to be accounted
for. Moreover, the identification of key players in a gang can help achieve higher reductions
in criminality by targeting these individuals. From a policy point of view, hard, soft, and
behavioral approaches towards fighting crime need to be thought of as complementary rather
than as substitutes. Policy design should therefore incorporate them into a broad approach
that tackles crime and combines and coordinates all efforts.
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Córdoba Moreno, S. (2015). La delincuencia organizada y su prevención. especial referencia
a las pandillas latinoamericanas de tipo violento. Universidad de Salamanca.
Corno, L. (2017). Homelessness and crime: Do your friends matter? The Economic Journal,
127(602):959–995.
Crowley, D. M. (2013). Building efficient crime prevention strategies: Considering the eco-
nomics of investing in human development. Criminology & Public Policy, 12(2):353.
Damm, A. P. and Dustmann, C. (2014). Does growing up in a high crime neighborhood
affect youth criminal behavior? American Economic Review, 104(6):1806–32.
de Chaisemartin, C. and d’Haultfoeuille, X. (2019). Two-way fixed effects estimators with
heterogeneous treatment effects. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Di Tella, R. and Schargrodsky, E. (2004). Do police reduce crime? estimates using the
allocation of police forces after a terrorist attack. American Economic Review, 94(1):115–
133.
Domı́nguez, M. and Montolio, D. (2019). Bolstering community ties as a means of reducing
crime. IEB Working Paper 2019/06.
Ehrlich, I. (1973). The deterrent effect of capital punishment: A question of life and death.
Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Complementary information and additional results
Figure A1: Metropolitan Area of Barcelona, and corresponding municipalities
Source: Own construction from Police Data and National Institute of Statistics.
41





Figure A3: Recovered criminal gang structure, before and after UGOV sweeps.
(a) Before (b) After
Note: This graph presents the network structure of individuals arrested in the sweeps and first degree known
peers before and after the sweeps were carried out. Each dot is an individual and each line indicates a link.
Source: Own construction from Local Police data.
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Figure A4: Event study exercise for all crimes and group crimes with a continuous treatment
indicator. 95% confidence intervals.
(a) Total crimes with continuous treat-
ment alpha centrality
(b) Group crimes with continuous treat-
ment alpha centrality
(c) Total crimes with continuous treat-
ment closeness
(d) Group crimes with continuous treat-
ment closeness
(e) Total crimes with continuous treat-
ment number of links
(f) Group crimes with continuous treat-
ment number of links
Notes: This graph reports the results of an event study exercise following Eq. (3) for total crimes (left
panel) and group crimes (right panel). Results are presented for pooled caught individuals and non-caught
co-offenders, with heterogeneous treatment intensity according to the alpha-centrality, closeness and number
of links criteria. The observational unit is an individual-quarter pair. Treated units are defined as in section
4.1, while treatment timing differed across units, according to intervention timing. Confidence intervals are
based on robust standard errors.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure A5: Event study exercise considering the estimator proposed by de Chaisemartin and
d’Haultfoeuille (2019)
(a) Total crimes of caught individuals (b) Group crimes of caught individuals
Notes: This graph reports the results of an event study exercise following Eq. (3) and de Chaisemartin and
d’Haultfoeuille (2019) for total crimes (left panel) and group crimes (right panel). Results are presented
for caught individuals. The observational unit is an individual-quarter pair. Treated units are defined as
in section 4.1, while treatment timing differed across units, according to intervention timing. Confidence
intervals are based on robust standard errors.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A1: Detailed crime heterogeneity for peers - UGOV sweeps
Motortheft Robbery Damages Injuries Sexual Threats Forgery Disobedience Drugs
Peer·Post -0.003 -0.009 -0.004 -0.017*** -0.010*** -0.006 -0.009 -0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.001)
Obs. 3,543,458 3,543,458 3,543,458 3,543,458 3,543,458 3,543,458 3,543,458 3,543,458 3,543,458
Indiv. 126,841 126,841 126,841 126,841 126,841 126,841 126,841 126,841 126,841
i FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
t FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: This table reports the results of the difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation following Eq. (1) for
the 2008-2014 period for peers. The observational unit is a individual-quarter pair and only individuals ever
commiting a group crime were included. Treated units are defined as in section 4.1, while treatment timing
differs across units, according to intervention timing. The coefficient showed is that of interest in a DiD setting,
being Peer·Post. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A2: Falsification exercise - Profiling




Number of individuals 25,619 25,619
i FE Y Y
t FE Y Y
Notes: This table reports the results of a difference-in-differences (DiD)
regression comparing criminal outcomes of individuals with similar char-
acteristics to those caught by UGOV interventions (potentially profiled)
with other individuals perceived as “high crime” prone, before and after the
unit creation. The observational unit is a individual-quarter pair and only
individuals ever committing a group crime were included. Treated units
are defined as those potentially profiled, while the post period is that af-
ter the UGOV creation. The coefficient showed is that of interest, being
Profile·Post. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.*** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.














Number of obs 145,530
Notes: This table reports the results of a logistic regression for a link for-
mation model. The dependent variable is an indicator on whether a pair of
criminals are linked or not. The observational unit is a pair of criminals.
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Appendix 2: Social Network Analysis
Social network analysis (SNA) is a process through which social structures are analyzed using
graph theory and its visualization. This approach fully characterizes the existing networks
in terms of their agents (called nodes) and links. The first step towards an SNA is to build
an adjacency matrix. In the simplest case, this matrix A is a square matrix of dimension n
(the number of nodes), and the element aij (known as a dyad) equals one when there is a
link from node i to node j, and zero otherwise. In this case, I create an adjacency matrix
in which the aij element is be equal to 1 when individuals i and j are co-offenders. Such a
task can be challenging due to its dimensions. Although this approach is merely descriptive
of the dataset and potential networks, it is also extremely enlightening and provides a first
approach to the existing criminal links. On this matter, I tested two hypotheses that are
well established in the existing literature regarding similarity between criminal partners and
interactions conditional on crime severity.
1) 1) I determine what characteristics drives co-offending among individuals. The ho-
mophily principle states that similarity breeds connection. This principle structures network
ties in every type of relationship, making such ties homogeneous with regards to many demo-
graphic, economic and even geographical characteristics. In the current study I only consider
demographics as it was the only available information. The resulting outcomes of the SNA
are studied as an outcome variable in the following way:
aij = α +BIndividualCharacteristicsij + ΓNetworkCharacteristicsij + εit (A1)
where aij is the ij -element of the previously built adjacency matrix (dyad), taking values
of either zero or one. Individual characteristics include homophily (similarity in character-
istics), which in this case will be defined by age, gender, and nationality. For networks
characteristics, a term for triangles is included in some specifications.
The previous equation is estimated using an Exponential Random Graph Model. Ex-
ponential family random graph models (ERGMs) are a general class of models based in
exponential-family theory for specifying the probability distribution for a set of random
graphs. Within this framework, it is possible to obtain maximum-likelihood estimates for
the parameters of a specified model for a given data set.
2) I test the relationship between crime severity and social interactions, derived from the
model presented by Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999). This model provides an index of social
interactions that suggests that the amount of social interactions is highest in petty crimes,
moderate in more serious crimes, and almost negligible in murder and rape. However, I
will simply tabulate the number of identified offenders per offence for each crime typology.
Although this approach is much simpler, it provides evidence in a similar direction.
Results
From a first approach to the administrative data provided by the Catalan Police, we observe
that Using the administrative data provided by the Catalan Police, I identify 563,889 arrests
registered in the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona. These correspond to 262,493 individuals,
as a significant proportion of criminals were caught more than once. Moreover, 216,472 of
these arrests involved individuals acting in groups. In terms of characteristics, almost a third
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were labeled as thefts, while 30% took place in Barcelona city.
When I analyze group crimes (those committed by more than one individual), I observe
that patterns regarding crime types and locations follow the same patterns as the general
trend. Additionally, and consistent with Glaeser et al. (1996), Table A4 indicates that around
half of all co-offending crimes were in petty-money-driven crimes such as thefts. Another
crime type that is prevalent in the co-offending structure is that of injuries. This could
relate to bar fights in which many individuals are caught at the same time and location
but are not necessarily a co-offending group or criminal network. Moreover, geographical
concentration in Barcelona City is higher. The table below shows that the vast majority
of the co-offending structure is composed of small groups. Indeed, more than two-thirds of
the co-offending sample was composed of co-offending pairs, and almost 90% of registered
criminal groups were composed of less than three individuals. However, this does not imply
that the same individual cannot commit crimes with more than three others at separate
events. Additionally, almost 6% of group crimes were committed by five or more individuals.
To provide a comprehensive yet concise analysis of these issues, new tools must be used.
Table A4: Main descriptives, caught offenders
All acts (A=563,889; O=262,493) Group acts (A=216,472; O=126,968)
Offenders Offenders
1 77.10
2 16.15 2 70.54
3 4.04 3 17.65
4 1.36 4 5.94
5+ 1.35 5+ 5.87
Crime Type Crime Type
Theft 28.2 Theft 33.6
Injuries 10.9 Injuries 14.1
Fraud 9.6 Fraud 12.9
Threats 9.0 Robbery 9.7
Road 8.2 Disobedience 7.1
Disobedience 7.7 Threats 6.8
Robbery 6.5 Damages 3.6
Gender Violence 4.3 Drugs 3.3
Damages 3.7 Gender Violence 2.7
Other person 3.2 Car Theft 2.2
Drugs 2.7 Other person 2.1
Municipality Municipality
Barcelona 61.9 Barcelona 65.9
L’Hospitalet 6.2 L’Hospitalet 5.9
Badalona 5.6 Badalona 5.5
El Prat 2.7 El Prat 2.4
Cornellà 2.5 Cornellà 2.2
Source: Own construction from Catalan Police data
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Taking a deeper look into the individuals involved in all criminal acts, as already men-
tioned, 262,493 individual criminals were identified. These offenders are the so-called nodes
of the SNA, and their main characteristics are shown in Table A5. Their demographics did
not follow the same pattern as that of the population in the city: only 25% of all offenders
were female, and 58% were Spanish nationals. For the overall population both figures are
higher. Regarding the age profile, it was also a younger population than the average. All of
these features are consistent with what was expected. On the matter of criminality, 55% of
all criminals were only arrested once. In turn, 45% of the sample were repeat offenders, and
almost 20% of the sample had been arrested at least four times.























tion from Catalan Police
data.
Regarding co-offending and repeat offender patterns, and as mentioned above, 45% of
all registered offenders were registered in the Police records with at least one other criminal
(co-offending). Moreover, 30% were registered more than once. From the intersection of
these two criteria, 20% of the sample was composed of criminals that had committed crimes
in groups and on repeated occasions (recidivism). Hence, from an empirical point of view,
understanding criminal networks, co-offending and recidivism is a highly relevant issue.
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Table A6: Co-offending and recidivism
No repeated Repeated Total
No co-offending 45 11 55
Co-offending 25 20 45
Total 70 30 100
Source: Own construction from Catalan Police data.
Looking closer at co-offending patterns, it was possible to identify 216,472 unique co-
offending pairs or links/edges in the SNA. One way to visualize SNA results is graphically.
In the figure below I plot both criminal individuals (nodes) and their connections (links) for
the entire sample. It is apparent that while some nodes are not connected whatsoever with
other observational units, some others are. Furthermore, some clusters or cores of darker
spots appear in the graph: this means nodes that are connected to third parties that are
also connected. To further understand this network some basic descriptive statistics are
presented in Table A7.
Figure A6: Criminal links in the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona.
Source: Own construction from Catalan Police data.
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Avg. degree 1.1 3.5
Diameter 37.0
Avg. path length 10.5
Density 6.29e-06
Source: Own construction from Catalan Police
data.
The first feature that can be noticed by visual inspection of the network is that it is rela-
tively sparse. This was confirmed statistically as the density value (indicating the proportion
of present edges from all possible edges in the network) is very low. This is also reflected
in the fact that the average degree (how many neighbors a given node has in the network)
is very close to 1. This also translates into the fact that the average path length (number
of steps along the shortest paths for all possible pairs of network nodes) is relatively high,
as is the diameter (the longest of all the calculated shortest paths in a network). When
keeping only those nodes for which the degree is higher than one (which means that they are
at least connected to one other individual), the sample was reduced to 126,968 nodes, while
keeping the same number of links. As a result, this network is more dense and connected.
In particular, the average degree increases to 3.5. The descriptive statistics for the network
restricted only to nodes with at least one link were similar to those reported by Lindquist and
Zenou (2014) (they reported a degree of 2.99, an average path length of 17 and a clustering
coefficient of 0.55).
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Figure A7: Nodes and links’ attributes, network subsample
(a) Nodes and Edges (b) Red=Female; Green=Male
(c) Blue=Native; Orange=For1; Green=For2 (d) Pink=Theft; Blue=Robbery; Green=Drugs
Source: Own construction from Catalan Police data
All these features as a whole indicate that although the network is not dense, there
appears to be local clustering related to nodes’ characteristics. This is illustrated in the
above set of figures, where I highlight (one at a time) characteristics of nodes and edges.
For visualization purposes, for this set of figures only individuals caught in 2008 in District
1 of the City of Barcelona were included. In these graphs, each dot is a node (individual)
and each line is an edge (link). The dots’ size indicates the number of detentions, while the
thickness of the line indicates how many times that link was formed. In all cases, it is clear
that the plotted characteristics regarding nodes such as gender or nationality, or regarding
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edges such as crime type, appear in a clustered manner. In other words, there is homogeneity
of each of these characteristics within the clusters of individuals.
Testing the homophily and severity hypotheses
The homophily principle states that similar individuals are more likely to interact. As
already mentioned, few characteristics that could be used to determine this were recorded
in the data: only age, gender, and nationality of the offender. Coefficients (β) can be
interpreted in a similar way to results from a logistic model. The coefficient on Edges
can be seen as the intercept, as it indicates the conditional log-odds for a tie that does
not match in characteristics nor will create a triangle. All other parameter estimates are
interpreted as log-odds. While for gender, nationality and age matches the coefficients β
are the components of the B vector of equation (1), the estimate for triangles pertains to
the γ parameter of equation (1). To obtain the odds for a tie I compute (eβ) and for the
corresponding probability I compute the ratio (eβ)/(1 + eβ). Both of these are presented,
alongside estimated coefficientes, in Table A8.
Table A8: ERG Model Results, Homophily
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Edges -9.00*** -9.49*** -10.67*** -10.92***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06)
Triangle 5.99*** 4.76***
(0.03) (0.03)
Gender match 0.84*** 0.85***
(0.04) (0.07)
Nationality match 2.50*** 2.16***
(0.03) (0.04)
Age match 1.29*** 1.17***
(0.05) (0.08)
BIC 76958 71753 71079 66816
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Figure A8: ERG Model diagnostics
Table A9: Interpretation of coefficients in homophily
model
Beta Odds Probability
β (eβ) (eβ)/(1 + eβ)
Edges -10.92 2E-05 2E-05
Triangle 4.76 116.75 0.99
Gender match 0.85 2.34 0.70
Nationality match 2.16 8.67 0.90
Age match 1.17 3.22 0.76
Note: This table presents the results of fitting an Exponential
Random Graph Model to test the homophily principle among
offenders. While the first column presents the estimated coef-
ficients, columns two and three present odds-ratios and proba-
bilities of a tie.
The results from the ERG model provide very strong evidence of homophily in all three
characteristics33. On the matter of the interpretation of coefficients, the probability of a tie
that does not close a triangle nor share any characteristic is 0%. Additionally, the odds for a
tie between criminals of the same gender (holding everything else constant) is 2.3 times higher
than for a tie between criminals from a different gender (or 70% more likely). Concerning
age, the odds rises to 3.2 and probability to 76%, while for nationality the odds is 8.7 and
probability is 90%. Nonetheless, the triangle parameter has the highest odds of 116.8. This
term speaks on the matter of closed triangles, which is usually seen as a clustering measure.
33I present results for the most complete model ran, which is also the one with the best fit to the data, as
it had the lowest BIC value. Moreover, and as presented in the Appendix, goodness-of-fit was also sufficient
as it passed the test diagnostics
54
This set of results would imply that, holding everything else constant, triad formation would
be the largest predictor of network formation, followed by offenders’ match on nationality.
Lastly, I tested in a very simple way the prediction of Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999) on
social interactions and severity. The conclusion these authors reached is that the higher the
severity of the crime, the lower the social/criminal interactions. In order to test this in a
simple way, I tabulated (by type of crime) the number of criminals per single act, as a share
of all acts of that type. The results of this exercise confirmed the above conclusion.
Table A10: Criminals per criminal act, shares by
crime type
1 2 3 4 5+
Family 0.96 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sexual 0.90 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.00
Gender violence 0.89 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.00
Threats 0.85 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.00
Damages 0.81 0.13 0.04 0.01 0.01
Overall Crime 0.77 0.16 0.04 0.01 0.01
Motortheft 0.74 0.20 0.04 0.01 0.00
Drugs 0.73 0.21 0.04 0.01 0.01
Injuries 0.71 0.20 0.05 0.02 0.02
Theft 0.70 0.22 0.06 0.02 0.01
Fraud 0.69 0.17 0.06 0.02 0.06
Robbery 0.62 0.25 0.08 0.03 0.02
Note: This table presents for each crime typology the distribu-
tion of acts depending on the number of co-offenders. Source:
Own construction from Catalan Police data.
Overall, the descriptive statistics above indicate that 77% of all criminal acts were com-
mitted by one individual, 16% by two individuals, and 1% by at least five individuals. When
I performed the same analysis for different crime categories, I found that those crimes that
can be labeled as more serious due to the harm they inflict on the victim (such as sexual
assault or gender violence) had a higher share committed by just one individual. In fact,
in these cases, 90% of criminal acts were single-authored. Hence, social interactions are low
in severe crimes. On the contrary, other categories that are usually defined as petty crime
(such as robbery or theft) had larger shares of criminal acts committed by more than one
individual. In such cases, individual criminal acts dropped to 70% or 60%. Thus, in less
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